Judicial Counter-Violence Initiative (JCVI)

Judicial Counter-Violence Initiative

A CJES-based Program Initiative

Designed and dedicated to improving the safety and security of the judiciary, counsel, court officials, employees, litigants/parties, general public… The JCVI mission objective is focused on accomplishing this while ensuring that the integrity and decorum of the courts are placed foremost.

In furtherance of this initiative the following two significant documents are currently being drafted for JCVI publication:

Court-Targeted Acts of Violence (C-TAV)

Court-Targeted Acts of Violence (C-TAV)

The CJES/JCVI Extensive Research Analysis (ERA) on courthouse shootings, bombings, and arson attacks – “Court-Targeted Acts of Violence” (C-TAV) – covers the 40-year period from1970-2009. C-TAV is quite simply the most comprehensive listing and study of court-related violent incidents in the United States ever conducted. The C-TAV Study is now available - See the CJES Publications page.   Reference CJES Bulletin: Court-Targeted Acts of Violence

2020 – The Court Security Manual

2020 – The Court Security Manual

“2020 – The Court Security Manual” is the preeminent source reference in the specialized field of judicial and court security. 2020 is designed to not only provide guidance and direction on what to do, but just as importantly – how to successfully establish and sustain it. The comprised informational materials, standards, guidelines, templates, bulletins, models, assessments,… will serve law enforcement and court/judicial security professionals through and beyond the next decade. Due to the sensitivity of material 2020 will be made available to approved officials/persons (as determined by CJES) circa August 2010. Reference CJES Bulletin: 2020 – The Court Security Manual

Informational Materials

 

Related Videos

Prisoner Security is Court Security:  A fundamental principle of basic threat management is continuously violated each and every day of the week in courthouses throughout the country.  Contrary to when a threat source has been identified and subsequent actions are taken to keep the threat source isolated from a protectee or target - identified threat sources (i.e. prisoners) in this case are actually brought before judicial officers and other potential targets/victims.  Can you imagine the Secret Service acquiescing to arranging a meeting between the President and any identified threat source?  Neither can they. 

Prisoner court productions however are a constitutionally protected right that outside court-ordered unique circumstances are an absolute.  This is one of many reasons why court/judicial security is a concentrated specialized field.  Consequently officials responsible for prisoner custody, control, detention, and transportation must acknowledge that upon any prisoner entering a courthouse they become a court security matter of concern.  Officials responsible for court security must in turn account for prisoner-related security considerations such as:  temporary confinement conditions, secured circulation, systems/equipment, proper courtroom positioning/placement, space design/layout, use of restraints, armed/unarmed personnel, intermediate weapons, weapon retention, avenues of escape, potential/real threat targets, security screening, command and control, testifying, evidence/exhibits, participants, searches, type of proceeding, etc.